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Trust the Process?: The Implementation of New Jersey’s Zero Emission Certificate Program 
Peter Strom* 
Abstract 
New Jersey is acting to position itself as a leader in the transition to clean energy in the United 
States.  New Jersey’s current asset mix requires nuclear power to be part of this plan, at least in 
the near term.  The nuclear industry is struggling, however, which has prompted the legislatures 
in several other states to institute programs to pay companies for the beneficial attributes of 
nuclear power generation that may not be valued by the market. New Jersey passed legislation 
requiring the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) to implement a program that may award 
Zero Emission Certificate (ZEC) payments to nuclear power generators.  These payments will be 
indirectly funded by New Jersey’s ratepayers.  When implementing the program, the BPU solicited 
public comment and granted some interested parties access to the program applicants’ 
confidential financial data.  The regulatory approval process prescribed by the legislation did 
little to engender public confidence that nuclear plant applicants were “at risk of closure” and 
therefore statutorily entitled to ZEC payments. The process raises larger questions about the role 
of government regulation in market environments, and whether citizens should look to government 
to provide certainty in process, or certainty of outcome. 
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Nuclear power plant closure is permanent. “They all close . . . they all do. That’s how 
they’re designed,” says Jennifer Stromsten of the Institute for Nuclear Host Communities.1  A 
plant’s inevitable closure, however, does not make the effects of closure any less significant.  In 
2014, the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant closed in Vernon, Vermont.2  The closure was a 
business decision, as plant owner and operator Entergy Corporation expected the closure to boost 
its cash flow by over $150 million.3  Entergy’s chairman called the decision “agonizing,”4 and it 
was.  The region experienced a $100 million drop in economic activity.5  The closure resulted in 
$358 million in lost salaries and tax revenue as well as a twenty percent increase in the municipal 
and property tax rates.6  Imported natural gas replaced the plant’s share of power generation within 
the state, and the increase in carbon emissions was the “functional equivalent of putting [one] 
million cars on the road.”7  Once a nuclear power plant operator decides to close and decommission 
 
1 Alan Greenblatt, This is What Happens When a Nuclear Plant Shuts Down, GOVERNING (May 30, 2017, 3:00 AM) 
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-nuclear-plant-closure.html.  
2 Establishes Nuclear Diversity Certificate Program: Hearing on S.B. 3560 Before a Joint Committee, 2017 Leg., 
217th Sess. 96 (NJ 2017) [hereinafter “December 20th Hearing] (statement of Maria Korsnick), transcript available at 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/senatu12042017.pdf.  
3 Brian Handwerk, Economics Force Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant to Close, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 
27, 2013) https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/great-energy-challenge/2013/economics-force-
vermont-yankee-nuclear-power-plant-to-close/. 
4 Id.  
5 Greenblatt, supra note 1.  
6 December 20th Hearing, supra note 2 at 124–25 (statement of Joshua Unruh). A 2014 study estimated that the 
“overall economic activity in the region associated with Vermont Yankee in its last year of operation” was almost 
$500 million. UMASS DONAHUE INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF VERMONT YANKEE CLOSURE 9 (Dec. 2014) 
http://www.donahue.umassp.edu/documents/UMDI_Economic_Impacts_VY_Closure_Dec2014.pdf. 
7 December 20th Hearing, supra note 2 at 90 (statement of Sen. Judd A. Gregg). 
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a plant, the decision is profoundly certain and irreversible. This stands in stark contrast to the cloud 
of uncertainty hovering over the nuclear power industry as it exists today. 
The current state of nuclear power generation technology is a far cry from its introduction 
as the technological advancement that was going to make electricity “too cheap to meter.”8  Among 
other things, plant construction costs have decimated this promise of ubiquitous commercial 
nuclear power generation.  The actual construction costs for seventy-five of the ninety-eight 
currently active nuclear power generating units in the U.S. exceeded the initially estimated costs 
by over 200 percent.9  Cost variability, and consequently financing uncertainty, has threatened the 
overall economic attractiveness of nuclear development.10 Labeled as "the largest managerial 
disaster in business history,”11 uncertainty is deeply engrained into the industry’s core. Engrained 
uncertainty led to a virtual moratorium on nuclear power plant construction began in the 1980s,12 
during which no new nuclear plant construction projects were initiated between 1977 and 2009.13  
At the turn of the century, expansion projects at existing nuclear plants in South Carolina 
and Georgia were supposed to ignite a “nuclear renaissance.”14 Memories of failed construction 
projects and exorbitant cost overruns gave way to a new-found urgency to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions that contribute to climate change.15 Although the nuclear lifecycle is not fully zero-
 
8 Cheap Dreams, Expensive Realities, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-
power/cost-nuclear-power#.W-mhLJNKg2x (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
9 SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC., NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION COSTS 7 (July 2008). 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Cheap Dreams, Expensive Realities, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
12  DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 407 (2011).  
13 Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-
profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx (updated April 2019). Excavation of the area where the new Plant 
Vogtle units were planned began in 2009. Plant Vogtle 3 and 4, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR, 
https://www.southerncompany.com/innovation/nuclear-energy/plant-vogtle-3-and-4.html (last visited April 22, 
2019). 





carbon, the generation of nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gasses.16 Given the significant 
number of operational nuclear power plants in the U.S., nuclear power figured to be a key climate 
change mitigation technology in the country’s cleaner energy future. 
Unsurprisingly, the expansion projects initiated over a decade ago remain incomplete with 
cost overruns in the tens of billions of dollars.17  Outside forces and continued project 
mismanagement make investment into new nuclear power generation projects increasingly 
unlikely.18  Compounding the issue, the industry must still deal with problems plaguing owners 
and operators in the continued operation of existing generation assets. Plants like Vermont Yankee 
have been forced into early retirement due to an inability to remain profitable within the markets 
in which they operate.  If all announced plant closures go forward, the total number of operational 
units will decline from ninety-eight to eighty-nine.19  Nuclear plant economic performance is 
hampered by “cheap natural gas, diminished demand for electricity, falling costs for renewable 
energy, rising operating costs, and safety and performance problems.”20 
Despite the industry’s struggles, nuclear power cannot be dismissed as a potential part of a 
long-term climate solution.21  Timelines for decarbonization of the power sector do not take into 
account early plant retirements, and scientists predict that that decarbonization must be achieved 
 
16 Id.  
17 The expansion project in Georgia was initially estimated to cost $14.3 billion.  In 2018, cost-to-completion estimates 
exceeded $27 billion. Sonal Patel, How the Vogtle Nuclear Expansion’s Costs Escalated, POWER (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.powermag.com/how-the-vogtle-nuclear-expansions-costs-escalated/?pagenum=3. 
18 M. Granger Morgan et. al., US Nuclear Power: The Vanishing Low-Carbon Wedge, 115 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 7184 (July 10, 2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/28/7184.full.pdf. 
19 Michael Shellenberger, Nuclear Plant Closures Show Why, When it Comes to Energy, Small is Expensive,  FORBES 
(Aug. 1, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/01/nuclear-plant-closures-
show-why-when-it-comes-to-energy-small-is-expensive/#58816e8571a2.  
20 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NUCLEAR POWER DILEMMA: DECLINING PROFITS, PLANT CLOSURES, AND 
THE THREAT OF RISING CARBON EMISSIONS, executive summary (2018), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-executive-summary.pdf 
21 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NUCLEAR POWER DILEMMA: DECLINING PROFITS, PLANT CLOSURES, AND 




by 2050 to avoid the worst consequences of climate change.22  Indeed, reports on climate change 
continue to increase in urgency,23 and many states have responded to these concerns by setting 
aggressive clean energy goals to eliminate the use of carbon-emitting fuels.24  To help states meet 
their clean energy goals, state legislatures have acted to prop up struggling nuclear power plants.  
Bills have been introduced, passed, challenged and upheld.25  In New York, the legislature created 
a zero-emission credit (ZEC) program, requiring state utilities to purchase ZECs26 generated by 
in-state nuclear power plants.27  Illinois modeled its program around New York’s program.28  The 
constitutionality of these programs is beyond the scope of this article, but it suffices to say that 
 
22 Id. 
23 In analyzing the most recent UN report on climate change, Caroline Haskins of Vice painted a bleak picture:  
“If we fail to meet [carbon emission reduction] goals and the earth warms by 2 degrees Celsius, according to the 
report, hundreds of millions of lives are at stake. Twice as many people would have unreliable access to water as do 
today. Food shortages in Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the South American 
Amazon will intensify. The range of heat-driven diseases like malaria will spread. Maize, rice, wheat will become 
about half as productive, and rice and wheat will become less nutritious. But 2 degrees of warming isn’t even a worst-
case scenario. If we keep releasing emissions at our current rate, the earth will warm by 4.8 degrees compared to pre-
industrial levels by 2100.” Caroline Haskins, Devastating UN Report: CO2 Emissions Must Go to Zero by 2050 to 
Avoid Worst Effects of Climate Change,  VICE (Oct. 8, 2018, 9:26 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/43eb4b/ipcc-15-degree-climate-change-report. 
24 New Jersey is the most recently minted member of the “50/30” club, calling for a fifty percent reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2030. This goal, part of the state’s Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) puts it in the same group as 
New York and California. The only other states that have more ambitious RPS goals are Vermont and Hawaii. 
Christian Roselund, New Jersey Joins The 50% By 2030 Renewable Energy Club, PV MAGAZINE (May 23, 2018), 
https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2018/05/23/new-jersey-joins-the-50-by-2030-renewable-energy-club/.  
25 Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 2018) (holding that the “ZEC program’s incidental 
effect on wholesale electricity rates insufficient to state a claim for field preemption”, the “program was not conflict 
preempted by [Federal Power Act]” and “plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claim the ZEC program violated dormant 
Commerce Clause”); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the program was 
“not preempted by the [Federal Power Act]” and that it “did not violate dormant Commerce Clause”). 
26 ZECs are “payments that electricity generators receive to compensate them for the valuable attribute of not emitting 
greenhouse gases in the production of electricity.” NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., ZERO-EMISSION CREDITS 3 
https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf.  
27 New York, ST. POWER PROJECT https://statepowerproject.org/new-york/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
28 Illinois, ST. POWER PROJECT https://statepowerproject.org/illinois/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
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each program was upheld in the Court of Appeals.29  The Supreme Court has subsequently denied 
petitions for certiorari.30 
New Jersey enacted its own ZEC program (with the “C” standing for “certificate”, not 
“credit”), signed into law by Governor Phil Murphy in May 2018.31  Based on the rulings of the 
Second and Seventh Circuits, it is unlikely that New Jersey’s program will be challenged on 
constitutional grounds.  The program’s implementation, however, presents interesting questions 
about how state governments should craft policy to meet ambitious clean energy goals without 
creating dysfunction in the energy markets or unfairly burdening ratepayers with large increases 
in energy bills.  Regulatory policy like the ZEC program is viewed as “not simply a palliative for 
occasional markets weaknesses, but rather as an integral part of a broader social system that 
encompasses economic institutions and relationships.”32  Policy is ultimately judged based on how 
well it achieves its objectives.33 The question that must be asked is whether the instituted regulatory 
process is one that is intended to achieve the “best” outcome, regardless of whether it meets the 
pre-determined policy objective; or if the policy objective – in this case, reduced carbon emissions 
– is the pre-determined outcome and the instituted regulatory process permits arriving at that pre-
determined outcome at any cost. 
 
29 Keith Goldberg, 7th Circ. Upholds Ill. Nuke Subsidy Program, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/projectfinance/articles/1082783/7th-circ-upholds-ill-nuke-subsidy-program; Keith 
Goldberg, 2nd Circ. Upholds NY Nuke Plant Subsidies; LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2018, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1086987/2nd-circ-upholds-ny-nuke-plant-subsidies.  
30 Rich Heidorn Jr., Supreme Court Won’t Hear ZEC Challenges (April 15, 2019), 
https://www.rtoinsider.com/supreme-court-wont-hear-zec-challenges-114578/. 
31 Peter Maloney, New Jersey Gov. Murphy Signs Bills Creating Zero Emission Credits for Nuclear,  UTILITYDIVE 
(May 24, 2018) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-jersey-gov-murphy-signs-bills-creating-zero-emission-
credits-for-nucle/524238/. 
32 GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 3 (Edward Balleisen & David A. Moss 
eds., 2009) 
33 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: 
CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 7 (2000), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/46466287.pdf. 
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Part II of this Comment will lay out a brief landscape of energy generation by nuclear 
power plants. Encompassed within this discussion is the development of nuclear power specific to 
the State of New Jersey, and an exploration of why state legislatures are working so hard to keep 
existing nuclear power generation assets competitive within the market. This will include a 
discussion on how the market works and how the ZEC program fits into the bigger picture of New 
Jersey’s clean energy initiatives. Part III will then dive into the legislation, discussing the 
legislative history, the statute, and the critical regulatory role of the New Jersey Board of Public 
Utilities (BPU)’s role in implementing the program.  Part IV will analyze the competing agendas 
of key regulatory players and use a similar saga that has played in out the State of Connecticut to 
show why legislative goals may be more determinative than the decision-making process that the 
legislatures implement. 
II.   Nuclear Energy’s Historical and Modern Landscape 
Nuclear power accounts for about twenty percent of U.S. electric generation.34  Despite a 
virtual moratorium on nuclear power plant construction beginning in the 1980s35, the nuclear 
power industry’s share of the energy market remains relatively unchanged due to dramatic 
operational improvements.36 Some estimates, however, predict that the nuclear industry’s market 
share will fall to eleven percent by 2050 as plant owners begin to act on plans to decommission 
units that are no longer profitable.37 A nine percent loss in overall U.S. electric generating capacity 
is significant and may lead to a sharp increase in carbon emissions if gas-fired plants replace the 
 
34 U.S. Nuclear Capacity and Generation Expected to Decline as Existing Generators Retire, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (May 12, 2017) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31192. 
35  DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 407 (2011).  
36 Id. Yergin views the improvement in nuclear power plant operating efficiency as so significant that “it can almost 
be seen as a new source of electric power itself.” 
37 U.S. Nuclear Capacity and Generation Expected to Decline as Existing Generators Retire, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (May 12, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31192.  
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loss.  This loss is exacerbated by the inability to bring a decommissioned nuclear power plant back 
online.38  Pursuant to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, a decommissioned 
plant is permanently out of use.39 
Although these concerns apply to nuclear power generators throughout the nation, the U.S. 
energy industry is regionally dynamic. Supply, demand, resource availability, geography and 
demographics all play a role in determining each state’s power generation profile.  Reviewing the 
development of nuclear energy within the state is therefore required before analyzing legislation 
benefitting nuclear plants at risk of closure. 
A. Nuclear Energy in New Jersey 
In New Jersey, there are currently three active nuclear reactors, with all three units located 
at the same location: the Salem-Hope Creek Generating Station.40  The station accounts for 35.8% 
of the state’s utility-scale net electricity generation,41 which is just shy of double the national 
 
38 Nuclear Decommissioning and Legal Risk, LATHAM & WATKINS (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/nuclear-decommissioning-legal-risk (“The NRC further instructs that 
licensees shall not perform any major decommissioning activities (defined as “any activity that results in permanent 
removal of major radioactive components, permanently modifies the structure of the containment, or results in 
dismantling components for shipment”) until 90 days after the NRC has received a licensee’s “post-shutdown 
decommissioning activities report” and until certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent 
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel have been submitted.”). 
39 Id. 
40 Salem is a dual unit reactor that is 57% owned by PSEG Nuclear LLC (a subsidiary of PSEG) and 43% by Exelon 
Corporation. Hope Creek is 100% owned by PSEG, and all three units are operated by PSEG Nuclear. PSEG Nuclear 
LLC, PSEG (last visited Jan. 6, 2018), 
https://corporate.pseg.com/aboutpseg/companyinformation/thepsegfamilyofcompanies/psegnuclearllc. Exelon 
Corporation owns six utilities that deliver electricity and natural gas to approximately ten million customers in 
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania through its subsidiaries. Exelon 
is also one of the largest competitive U.S. power generators, with more than 32,700 megawatts of nuclear, gas, wind, 
solar and hydroelectric generating capacity. About Exelon, EXELON, http://www.exeloncorp.com/company/about-
exelon. (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
41 “Net generation” refers to “the amount of gross generation less the electrical energy consumed at the generating 
station(s) for station service or auxiliaries.” Electric Power Monthly with Data for October 2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., (December 2018) https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_month/epm.pdf. “Utility-scale” owns a 
more loose definition and is most commonly associated with solar and other renewables. Generally, utility-scale 
facilities have a power-purchase agreement with a utility company, guaranteeing a market for its energy for a fixed 
period of time. Patrick Donnelly-Shores, What Does ‘Utility-Scale Solar’ Really Mean?, GREEN TECH MEDIA (July 
30, 2013), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/what-does-utility-scale-solar-really-mean#gs.gCADy86g. 
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average for utility-scale net generation.42  Generation has fallen from 2,533,000 megawatt-hours 
in October 2017 to 1,946,000 megawatt-hours in October 2018.  This twenty-three percent drop in 
net generation is due to the closure of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (“Oyster Creek”), 
located in Lacey, New Jersey, on September 17, 2018.43 
At the time of its closure, Oyster Creek was the oldest operating nuclear power plant in the 
country.44  Exelon Corporation was the owner and operator of Oyster Creek45, which was a success 
by nuclear industry standards.  Despite its early retirement, it should be considered a success 
because of the unfortunately low standards the industry has set with its track record of nuclear 
plant construction.46  The abandonment of nuclear reactors already under construction has been a 
surprisingly frequent occurrence in the history of the U.S. nuclear industry.  Plans to construct 
over one hundred separate reactors have been cancelled and thirty-six of these reactors were 
already under construction.47  The amount of money lost on these investments is staggering48 but 
the outstanding funding required to complete these capital-intensive projects is very often the 
 
42 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: NEW JERSEY ST. ENERGY PROFILE (last updated Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=NJ. The U.S. average for state utility-scale net generation of nuclear energy 
is 18.1%. 
43 Darrell Proctor, Oldest U.S. Nuclear Plant Shuts Down, POWER (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.powermag.com/oldest-u-s-nuclear-plant-shuts-down/. 
44 Id. 
45 Exelon has reached an agreement to sell Oyster Creek to Holtec International, a company with extensive experience 
employing spent nuclear fuel management technology to carry out nuclear power plant decommissioning. The 
transaction will clear once the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves it.  
PRESS RELEASE: Holtec International to Purchase Oyster Creek Generating Station, Decommission Nuclear Plant 
within Eight Years, MARKETWATCH (July 31, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/holtec-
international-to-purchase-oyster-creek-generating-station-decommission-nuclear-plant-within-eight-years-2018-07-
31. 
46 See SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 9. 
47 Sonal Patel, The Big Picture: Abandoned Nuclear, POWER (Feb. 1, 2018) https://www.powermag.com/the-big-
picture-abandoned-nuclear/. 
48 The nuclear expansion project in South Carolina was cancelled after nine billion dollars of investment. Andrew 





reason for their abandonment.   New Jersey has had two nuclear power plant projects derailed: the 
world’s first floating nuclear reactor49 and the Forked River Nuclear Power Plant.   
The failure to bring the Forked River Nuclear Power Plant to fruition provides a good 
example of how a confluence of outside forces can lead to project cancellation.  In 1969, Jersey 
Central Power and Light50 (“Jersey Central”) proposed constructing the plant in Forked River, 
New Jersey.51  The company halted plant construction in 1974,52 but prevailed in a legal battle to 
resume construction in 1976.53  This victory would prove to be short-lived due to the events that 
unfolded as the construction timeline dragged on.  
In early March 1979, a worker was killed in a construction accident at the Forked River 
site.54  Later that month, an incident of monumental proportions occurred at one of Jersey Central’s 
other nuclear power plants: Three Mile Island. Jersey Central was part owner of the active plant’s 
 
49 PSE&G  had grand plans to build the world’s first floating reactor  off the coast of Atlantic City.   PSE&G engineer 
Richard Eckert hatched the idea which proved to be a catalyst for corporate and government investment into the 
scientific viability of the project during the early 1970s.   It was unexpectedly not safety or environmental concerns 
that caused PSE&G to nix the idea.  The 1973 oil embargo  raised the price of electricity which resulted in a 
corresponding long-term decrease in demand.   With diminished demand, the incentive to invest in new electric 
generation was gone. Matt Reimann, In the 1980s, A Power Company Almost Built a Floating Nuclear Power Plant 
Off New Jersey, MEDIUM: TIMELINE (April 13, 2017), https://timeline.com/floating-nuclear-power-plants-
c808bfe707aa; 49 Oil Embargo, 1973-74, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-
1976/oil-embargo (last visited January 11, 2019). 
50 Jersey Central Power and Light was a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation. In 1996, General Public 
Utilities reorganized as a holding company and was renamed GPU, Inc. In 2001, FirstEnergy Corporation merged 
with GPU Inc. In November 2016, the company made the decision to exit the competitive power business and become 
a fully regulated company. FirstEnergy, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FirstEnergy (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
51 Forked River Nuclear Power Plant, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forked_River_Nuclear_Power_Plant 
(last visited January 11, 2019). 









first and second units located in Middleton, Pennsylvania.55  Three Mile Island’s second reactor 
caused what has been labeled “the worst accident in the history of commercial nuclear power in 
the United States.”56  A combination of “personnel error, design deficiencies, and component 
failures” caused the nuclear reactor’s core to overheat and melt down.57 The political and 
regulatory fallout from Three Mile Island was tremendous, and is objectively responsible for 
permanent changes to plant safety regulation.58 Jersey Central experienced serious financial 
difficulties in the wake of the accident. The company was forced to shut down operations at Forked 
River, and as of November 7, 1980, five percent of the plant had been completed with a price tag 
of $394 million.59  Adjusted for inflation, the same failed effort would have cost Jersey Central 
over $1 billion today.60   
The virtual impossibility of completing a nuclear power plant construction project on time 
or on budget haunts the industry. The average total construction cost overrun for seventy-five 
nuclear units initiated between 1966 and 1977 was more than triple the estimated cost.61 New 
Jersey’s currently active nuclear power plants are no exception. Construction for Salem’s first unit 
began in 1968 and the unit did not come online until 1976.62  As of April 1974, the cost of building 
 
55 A Corporate History of Three Mile Island, THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT, http://www.tmia.com/corp.historyTMI (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2019).  
56 J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: A NUCLEAR CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004).  
57 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last visited January 11, 2019). 
58 Id. 
59 Plan for New Reactor Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1980, https://www.nytimes.com/1980/11/07/archives/plan-
for-new-reactor-dropped.html. 
60 This figure was generated using an online source for calculating inflation. The Inflation Calculator, 
https://westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
61 David Schlissel & Bruce Biewald, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION COSTS, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, 
INC. 8 (July 2008). 




both of Salem’s units was $700 million over budget.63  The first unit came online one year after its 
originally scheduled date, and the second unit’s opening was delayed by over five years.64 
Companies are understandably reluctant to invest in new nuclear power generation projects 
given these struggles.  Despite these uncertainties, the Salem-Hope Creek Generating Facility has 
positively impacted the State in many ways. As the second largest nuclear generating facility in 
the United States,65 the facility generates enough electricity for three million homes daily66 and is 
the largest employer in the county with 1,500 employees.67  Most importantly for its survival, the 
electricity generated at the site produces no greenhouse gas emissions.68  Plant operators, however, 
are not compensated for the beneficial impact nuclear power has in helping the state reach clean 
energy goals.69  To understand why, one must understand the market within which nuclear power 
generators must operate. 
B. The Market for Nuclear 
The recent introduction of competitive markets into the traditionally regulated energy 
industry has injected more uncertainty into the nuclear landscape.  “Traditionally regulated” means 
that one, vertically integrated electric utility company oversees the entire chain of power delivery 
for a designated region.70 State commissions set rates, promising a “fair return” to the private 
 
63 I tried very hard to find this article again but it isn’t coming up. I am going to find it and update this footnote 
appropriately. 
64 Id. 




68 Id. Nuclear fission reactions are themselves free of carbon emissions. However, the nuclear power “lifecycle”, 
including uranium mining, milling, and enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor construction, reactor decommissioning, 
fuel reprocessing, nuclear waste disposal, and mine site rehabilitation.  
69 See, infra, Part II.B.1. 
70 ARTHUR MAZER, ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING FOR REGULATED AND DEREGULATED MARKETS 1 (2007). 
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companies who serve the power grid in exchange for reliable service to the general public.71 
Electric utilities were initially thought to be natural monopolies, and competition within this 
market was inappropriate.72 
The approach to electric power markets started to shift in the 1980s. As described in Part 
A, large investment into nuclear projects turned out to be “uneconomical.”73  This was coupled 
with a “sea change” in economic thinking during this time, which showed “increased faith in the 
ability of markets to achieve efficient outcomes through competition and reduced faith in the 
ability of governments to achieve efficient outcomes through regulation or production of 
service.”74  By deregulating the chain of power delivery, market participants would each fill a 
different role: generation on one side, transmission and distribution of the electricity on the other.75  
This “unbundling” of vertically integrated utilities was intended to increase the efficiency of 
investment into new generating plants, placing the risk of managerial decisions and changes in 
market conditions on suppliers of generation service.76  Ending the politicized resource planning 
process was meant to benefit the ratepayer, bringing down high electricity prices by providing 
better incentives to control construction costs, improve operating performance, innovate in 
generating technology and retire generators that are uneconomic.77 
 
71 David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 1010 (2017). 
72 David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767 (2008). 
73 Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector, in DEREGULATION OF 
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 113, 120–21 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds. 2000), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctvdmx09q?turn_away=true. 
74 Spence, supra note 72, at 770. 
75 Mazer, supra note 70, at xi (“Traditionally, utilities have assumed the role of planning and operating power systems 
on behalf of their customers. Utilities have developed expertise in these areas. As the industry moves away from a 
utility environment, other market participants are assuming the functions that utilities had. The Independent System 
Operator (ISO) operates the transmission network. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) build, own, and operate 
plants. Retailers procure load on behalf of a customer base. Within a traditionally regulated utility environment, these 
responsibilities are within the purview of utility planning. Within the new environment, they fall under new labels: 
asset management, investment analysis, and risk management.”) 
76 Joskow, supra note 73, at 121. 
77 Id. at 121, 185. 
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The Federal Energy Resource Commission (FERC) issued a series of initiatives to 
encourage deregulation.78  Utilities were encouraged to divest generation assets and instead buy 
and sell generation services on competitive wholesale markets.79  As some state utilities fell in line 
and restructured their utility business models, interstate wholesale power market institutions were 
formed.80 There are now seven regional markets in the U.S., each organized as a regional 
transmission operator (RTO) or independent system operator (ISO), serving the same functions: 
operate the transmission grid, dispatch generators and organize wholesale energy markets.81  
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia operate within regional markets.82  New Jersey is one 
such deregulated state operating within the PJM Interconnection regional market.83 
As energy markets have trended toward increased competition and energy pricing through 
market mechanisms, Professor David Spence posits that the two basic challenges of energy policy 
are to (1) ensure well-functioning markets and fair prices and (2) manage the “many and varied 
externalities associated with the production and delivery of energy.”84  As energy markets become 
freer, government regulation is introduced to ameliorate the inefficient or unfair consequences of 
market failure.85  PSEG CEO Ralph Izzo states that there are “public policy objectives to be 
achieved that are not directly reflected in the cost of producing energy” and that energy markets 
don’t work when the positive externalities are not priced.86 
 
78 Spence, supra note 72, at 773–74. 
79 Joskow, supra note 73, at 127. 
80 Id. at 126. 
81 Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last visited April 21, 2019). 
82 PAUL ZUMMO, AM. PUB. POWER. ASS’N, RETAIL ELECTRIC RATES IN DEREGULATED AND REGULATED STATES 2 
(May 2018), https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/Retail-Electric-Rates-in-Deregulated-States-
2017-Update%20%28003%29.pdf. 
83 Id. at 2, 5. 
84 Spence, supra note 71, at 975. 
85 JAMES E. HICKEY, JR. ET. AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2–31 (2000). 
86 December 20th Hearing, supra note 2, at 6. 
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The ZEC legislation is intended to price nuclear power’s positive externalities – fuel 
diversity, air quality, resilience, and other environmental attributes.87  Before reviewing the ZEC 
program implementation, one must understand the meaning of these key terms within the statute. 
It is also important to note that the New Jersey legislature does not operate in a vacuum. FERC’s 
regulatory actions over RTOs and ISOs are intimately intertwined with member states’ legislative 
actions. As such, the legislation provides that ZEC payments issued to eligible and selected nuclear 
power plants are subject to a dollar-for-dollar reduction if federal regulatory initiatives that are 
intended to compensate nuclear power producers for nuclear power’s positive externalities result 
in increased revenue for the plants.88 
1.  “Fuel Diversity, Air Quality, Resilience and Other Environmental Attributes” 
 In the ZEC program’s enabling legislation, ZECs are defined as “certificate[s], issued by 
the board or its designee, representing the fuel diversity, air quality, and other environmental 
attributes of one megawatt-hour of electricity generated by an eligible nuclear power plant.”89  The 
program requires annual determinations that eligible plants are not paid twice for these attributes.90  
If the generators receive payments from any other source, the ZEC payments will be immediately 
reduced by the amount of the payment received.91  The legislative history demonstrates that 
lawmakers accounted for concerns that potential changes to the PJM market could result in 
 
87 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3-87.4 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3-87.5(e)(4) (2018). 
88 N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 48.3-87.5(e)(4) (2018). 
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3-87.4 (2018). 




increased revenue for nuclear power generators.92  The legislation does not specifically define 
these termed attributes, which are considered in turn. 
First, keeping nuclear power in the generation mix increases fuel diversity. 
Overdependence on one fuel source is problematic for many reasons. Primarily, it exposes the 
market to volatile price swings.93  Price swings can foreclose the opportunity to invest in new 
technology if industry players suddenly become insolvent because of a reduction in resource 
affordability.  Relatedly, fuel diversity is “the most cost-effective tool available to manage the 
inherent production cost risk involved in transforming primary energy fuels into electricity.”94  A 
diverse resource mix also “helps to ensure stability and reliability in electricity supply and 
strengthens national security.”95  Should New Jersey’s nuclear units shut down, natural gas is 
expected to fill the void because of it prevalence and affordability. PSEG predicts that natural gas 
will provide ninety-four percent of the electricity to New Jersey without nuclear power in the 
mix.96 At that high rate, the protections fuel diversity affords are limited. 
Second, nuclear power is lauded for its contributions to improved air quality. The Clean 
Air Act identifies five pollutants97 which are linked to chronic diseases and higher mortality rates.98  
Air pollution is responsible for the deaths of seven million people each year, according to an 
 
92 See Hearing on Strategies to Prevent the Premature Retirement of Existing, Licensed, and Operating Nuclear Power 
Plants, 2017 Leg., 217th Sess. 58–59 (NJ 2017) [hereinafter December 4th Hearing], transcript available at 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/senatu12042017.pdf.  
93 George W. Sharp, Fuel Diversity is Critical in Industry Transition, POWER, (Sept. 1, 2012), 
https://www.powermag.com/fuel-diversity-is-critical-in-industry-transition/.  
94 J. Scott Peterson, Analysis: The Value of Electricity Diversity, THE HILL (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://thehill.com/sponsored/content/240164-analysis-the-value-of-electricity-diversity. 
95 Fuel Diversity, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/fueldiversity/pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
96 IMPACTS OF PSEG NUCLEAR UNIT SHUTDOWNS ON NEW JERSEY’S GLOBAL WARMING RESPONSE ACT LIMITS, 
PSEG 9 (November 2018). 
97 These pollutants are carbon monoxide, particulates, sulfur oxides, nitric oxides, and hydrocarbons. DANIEL A. 




October 2018 analysis.99 The reduction in these separate pollutants, aside from carbon dioxide, is 
the benefit that legislators are identifying when they refer to “air quality” in the statute. 
Third, nuclear power contributes to grid resilience. The concept of resilience has been 
characterized as different from but, interconnected with, reliability.100 For a power grid to be 
resilient, it must learn from and adapt to disruptive incidents that are inevitable but cannot always 
be predicted.101 In comparison, reliability is more of a “binary” concept, less focused on learning 
from past mistakes and more on the consistency of system performance.102 Resilience can be 
thought of as broader than reliability, concerned about “limiting the scope and impact of outages 
when they do occur, restoring power rapidly afterwards, and learning from these experiences to 
better deal with events in the future.”103 
In New Jersey, the conversation about resilience picked up significantly after Superstorm 
Sandy,104 which highlighted that measuring and improving upon power system resilience must 
also go beyond electricity generation to include transmission and distribution (“T&D”) efforts.   In 
fact, in-depth study of the issue reveals that “few power outages . . . are cause[d] by generation or 
fuel shortages” and “generation investment is unlikely to be a cost-effective way to reduce 
customer outages relative to transmission and distribution measures.”105 Significantly, nuclear 
 
99 Monica Serrano & Sean McNaughton, Polluted Air is Lethal in These Parts of the World, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 
2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/10/embark-data-sheet-air-pollution-world-lethal/. 
100 Aaron Clark-Ginsberg, What’s the Difference Between Reliability and Resilience?, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 




103  Rich Heidorn Jr., DOE Panel Hears Results of Academies’ Resilience Study, RTOINSIDER (Sept. 17, 2017), 
https://www.rtoinsider.com/doe-ferc-grid-study-outages-49484/.  
104 See Andrew Winston, Hurricane Sandy Lesson: Resilience Isn’t Enough, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Oct. 29, 
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/hurricane-sandys-lesson-resilience-isnt-enough.  




subsidies were considered “low value” resilience measures because generating capacity additions 
continue to outpace retirement and load growth.106 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) has defined resilience as “the ability to withstand and reduce the magnitude and/or 
duration of disruptive events, which includes the capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or 
rapidly recover from such an event.”107 The value that nuclear power assets add to grid resilience 
is currently being evaluated.108  
Lastly, the legislation rewards nuclear power for its “other environmental attributes.” 
Iimprovements in air quality standards and reduction in greenhouse gasses like carbon dioxide that 
contribute to climate change are being treated as two separate categories by legislators. When 
legislators refer to the “other environmental attributes” of nuclear power, they are referring to the 
beneficial impact nuclear power generation has in fighting against the harmful effects of climate 
change. The effects of carbon dioxide on our atmosphere are unnerving,109 well-documented,110 
and the impetus for the aggressive target dates set by states to eliminate carbon-emitting fuel 
sources from their energy resource mix.111  
The legislation’s focus on these beneficial attributes of nuclear power indicates that the 
state intends to reward nuclear plants for these contributions. The purpose of the ZEC program 
 
106 Id. at 60. 
107 Elisa Wood, Electric Resilience to get FERC-level Attention. But Not the Way the Trump Administration Hoped, 
MICROGRID KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://microgridknowledge.com/resilience-ferc/. 
108 See December 4th Hearing, supra note 92. 
109 See Haskins, supra note 23. 
110 The extent of climate change studies throughout the world in the past century is so pervasive that it has become 
almost less of a scientific issue than a political issue, even though it must be grounded in science to have any meaning. 
See Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, The Politics of Climate,  PEW RESEARCH CENTER: INTERNET & TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 
4, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/ (“There are … major divides in the way 
partisans interpret the current scientific discussion over climate, with the political left and right having vastly divergent 
perceptions of modern scientific consensus, differing levels of trust in the information they get from professional 
researchers, and different views as to whether it is the quest for knowledge or the quest for professional advancement 
that drives climate scientists in their work.”). 
111 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3-87.3(1) (2018). 
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runs deeper, however. Approximately one third of New Jersey’s electric power is generated by 
Salem-Hope Creek.112 This legislation is intended to do more than correct for market 
inefficiencies.  It is a recognition that if markets work as intended – forcing uneconomic assets 
into early retirement – the State will not have the generating capacity from clean energy sources 
to simultaneously meet high electricity demand and ambitious carbon reduction goals. 
2. New Jersey’s Clean Energy Goals 
May 23, 2018 was a momentous day for the future of New Jersey’s clean energy economy.  
An executive order and two separate bills were signed into law by Governor Phil Murphy – 
Executive Order No. 28, A3723, and S2313.113  Collectively, they established a plethora of 
programs, standards and incentives intended to meet State goals.114   
Executive Order No. 28  directs state agencies (including the BPU) to develop an updated 
Energy Master Plan (EMP) that provides a path to one hundred percent clean energy by 2050.115  
The order fails to define “clean energy,” but condemns “traditional methods of energy production 
that rely on the burning of fossil fuels” as harmful. Clean energy is any method of energy 
production that does not require the burning of fossil fuels to generate power. The Department of 
Energy’s website lists solar, wind, water, geothermal, bioenergy and nuclear as the currently 
available energy resources that will carry the day in the clean energy revolution.116 
The first bill – A3723 – requires the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard to be fifty percent 
by 2030 and sweeps broadly in setting up goals and programs for different sources of renewable 
 
112 See Electric Power Monthly with Data for October 2018, supra note 41. 
113 Governor Murphy Signs Measures to Advance New Jersey’s Clean Energy Economy, STATE OF NEW JERSEY (May 
23, 2018), https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562018/approved/20180523a_cleanEnergy.shtml. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Clean Energy, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/science-innovation/clean-energy (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).  
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energy, including offshore wind, solar and energy storage.117  In November 2018, the state and its 
university, Rutgers, agreed to a six-month, $300,000 contract to analyze the needs and 
opportunities for energy storage within the state.118  
Lastly, the second bill – S2313 – is the legislation that enables the BPU to set up a ZEC 
program for both in-state and out-of-state producers of nuclear power.119  The bill sets timelines 
and guidelines for the establishment of the program by the BPU.120   The program signifies New 
Jersey’s commitment to nuclear power as part of its clean energy future.  The ZEC program intends 
to prevent against the early – and permanent – retirement of Salem-Hope Creek and retain New 
Jersey’s most significant source of zero-carbon electricity generation.  The foregoing sections  – 
including New Jersey’s deregulated power market, the beneficial attributes of nuclear power not 
factored into its market price, and the State’s clean energy goals – provide a useful framework for 
analyzing the statute’s language as well as the political battles that have played out over the course 
of the program’s implementation.  
III. The Zero Emission Certificate Program 
 The enabling legislation for the program was signed into law by Governor Phil Murphy on 
May 23, 2018.  As of that date, the BPU was statutorily required to adopt a method for determining 
eligibility and selection of nuclear power plants to participate in the State’s ZEC program by 
November 19, 2018.121  On that day, the BPU issued an order affirming the program and its 
 
117 Id.  
118 Michelle Brunetti, N.J. regulator contracts with Rutgers for energy storage analysis, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY 
(October 30, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/breaking/n-j-regulator-contracts-with-rutgers-for-
energy-storage-analysis/article_28c0ae7c-ac22-5ad8-ba85-038404f5b316.html.  
119 See Governor Murphy Signs Measures to Advance New Jersey’s Clean Energy Economy, supra, note 114. 
120 Id.  
121 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3-87.5(b)(1) (2018). 
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application process.122 As stipulated by the November 19 Order, PSEG123 and Exelon submitted 
applications to the BPU for the Salem I, Salem II and Hope Creek units on December 19, 2018.124  
In conjunction with the BPU, the Division of Rate Counsel’s Director, Stefanie A. Brand,125 and 
PJM’s Independent Market Monitor (IMM), Joseph Bowring,126 reviewed the applications to 
determine eligibility.127 Brand and Bowring were granted intervenor status128  which allowed them 
to review applicants’ confidential financial information.129  The redacted comments lay bare that 
the most hotly contested issue is whether PSEG requires the ZEC payments to continue operating 
its nuclear plants in the near term.  
A. Legislative History 
 
122 I/M/O the Implementation of L. 2018, c. 16 Regarding the Establishment of a Zero Emission Certificate Program 
for Eligible Nuclear Power Plants, Order Establishing the Program, Application, and Procedural Process (Nov. 19, 
2018) https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/pdf/boardorders/2018/20181120/11-19-18-9A.pdf (hereinafter “November 19 
Order”). 
123 A brief history of PSEG and its related entities is required. In 1903, Public Service Corporation was formed, 
consolidating over 400 transportation, gas and electric companies. Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) was 
formed shortly thereafter in 1928 when Public Service Corporation merged its electric and gas utilities into a single 
company. Public Service Corporation dissolved in 1948 and PSE&G became an independent company. In 1985, Public 
Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) Incorporated was created as a holding company which currently has three operating 
subsidiaries: PSE&G, PSEG Long Island, and PSEG Power. Public Service Enterprise Group, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Service_Enterprise_Group (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). PSEG Power is most 
relevant for the purposes of this article. PSEG Power has five main subsidiaries: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; PSEG Fossil, 
LLC; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade, LLC; PSEG Power Ventures; and PSEG Energy Solutions. PSEG Nuclear 
owns and operates all three active nuclear units in New Jersey. PSEG Power, PUB. SERV. ENTER. GRP. INC., 
https://corporate.pseg.com/aboutpseg/companyinformation/thepsegfamilyofcompanies/psegpower (last visited Nov. 
11, 2018). 
124 PSEG Nuclear LLC – ZEC Applications, PSEG, 
https://corporate.pseg.com/aboutpseg/companyinformation/thepsegfamilyofcompanies/zec_applications (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2019). 
125 As the Director of the Division of Rate Counsel, Stefanie A. Brand represents the interests of consumers of 
regulated electric, natural gas, water/sewer, telecommunications, cable TV service, and insurance. Meet the Division 
Director, STATE OF NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL, https://www.state.nj.us/rpa/about/director/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2019). 
126 Dr. Bowring has been the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, responsible for all market monitoring activities 
of PJM Interconnection, since 1999. He has served as senior staff economist for the New Jersey Board of Public 
Utilities and as Chief Economist for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate's Division of Rate Counsel. 
Executive Team, MONITORING ANALYTICS 
127 November 19 Order, supra note 122, at 13-14. 
128 Id. 
129 Intervenor status is conditioned upon acceptance of Agreement of Non-Disclosure of Information Claimed to Be 
Confidential (NDA). Id. at 7-8. 
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Discussions surrounding this program began on the State’s Senate floor on December 4, 
2017.130  The split between those who favored and did not favor legislation implementing the 
program was less about environmental issues and more about whether consumers and businesses 
in the state need to be paying PSEG and Exelon for uncertainty in the market. In fact, one speaker 
noted the fact that environmentalists came to the floor with pro-nuclear stances is “a testament to 
how much has changed.”131 
First to speak was PSEG CEO Ralph Izzo. His recommended approach was: (1) have the 
BPU administer an economic need test; (2) compensate the ratepayers for market “corrections” on 
the federal or PJM regional level; and (3) revisit the program every three years.132 Speaking in 
agreement, Congressman Frank LoBiondo said that “state government plays an important role in 
addressing market flaws in wholesale energy markets,”133 suggesting that Izzo and others are right 
that the market should pay nuclear power generators for its positive externalities. 
In contrast, William Harla, an attorney representing the New Jersey Coalition for Fair 
Energy, believed that such a proposal will “distort the marketplace, and create an unfair advantage” 
for one power producer over another. 134  He also called the proposal a plan to re-regulate a market 
that PSEG fought hard to deregulate in the 1999 and 2000.135  A representative for New Jersey 
Large Energy Users Coalition (NJLEUC) said that “the state should not be correcting market 
issues.”136 Dennis Hart, Executive Director of the Chemical Industry Council of New Jersey, said 
 
130 See generally December 4th Hearing, supra note 92. 
131 Id. at 40. 
132 Id. at 11. 
133 Id. at 17. 
134 Id. at 56-57. 
135 See December 4th Hearing, supra note 92, at 59. 
136 Id. at 56-57. 
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that PSEG  not earning the cost of capital is something altogether different from not being 
profitable and therefore not economically viable.137 
Lastly, intervenors Joseph Bowring and Stefanie Brand both contributed at the hearing. Dr. 
Bowring’s point was straightforward: “The market is working.”138  He went on to say that there is 
a “temptation” to look for out-of-market solutions in times of stress, but that subsidies are 
“contagious,” suggesting that programs in New York and Illinois are causing regulators to inject 
out-of-market solutions into a market that is functioning without it.139  He conceded that pricing 
carbon may be a necessary next step, but that subsidizing specific plants is not the way forward.140  
Ms. Brand’s contributions were less definitive. She suggested that in-market solutions were more 
appropriate, but mainly posited that it put ratepayers at risk to rush through “lame duck” legislation 
without definitively knowing that these nuclear power plants are losing money as a result of market 
forces.141 
On December 14, 2017, a bill was introduced to establish a “Nuclear Diversity Certificate” 
Program, but failed to pass.142  On January 9, 2018, the bill was reintroduced that was largely 
identical. At a hearing on January 25, 2018, Senate President Stephen M. Sweeney, sponsor of the 
bill, stated: “This creates one thing – a process of review where PSEG will show their books to the 
BPU and BPU has the authority and ability to make a determination at that point. There is no 
 
137 Id. at 65. 
138 Id. at 68.  For Dr. Bowring, the market is “working” when it is operating based on principles of economic efficiency. 
His overall outlook is unchanged by the fact that a “working” market may permanently close nuclear power plants 
that are key to carbon reduction goals. 
139 Id. at 69. 
140 December 4th Hearing, supra note 92, at 69-70. 
141 Id. at 89. 
142 Stefanie A. Brand, Division of Rate Counsel, Comment Brief I/M/O the Implementation of L. 2018, C.16 
Regarding the Approval Establishment of a Zero Emission Certificate Program for Tariff Eligible Nuclear Power 
Plants, p. 14-15 (Jan. 31, 2019) 
https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/pdf/publicnotice/zec%20comments/EO18080899_Zero_Emmission_Certificate_Pro
gram_Rate_Counsel_PUBLIC%20VERSIO....pdf (hereinafter “Stephane A. Brand Comment Brief”). 
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guarantee here.”143 Although the January 9 Bill did not pass, the bill that was introduced on March 
22 and passed on April 12 is in line with Senator Sweeney’s statement. 
B. The ZEC Act 
The law introducing the ZEC program required New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities144 
to adopt a method for determining eligibility and selection of nuclear power plants to participate 
in the program by November 19, 2018.145  The act also establishes plant eligibility criteria. An 
eligible plant shall: (1) be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission146 (NRC) through 
2030; (2) demonstrate a significant and material contribution to New Jersey air quality 
(“minimizing emissions”); (3) demonstrate anticipated plant shut down within three years due to 
its financial condition; (4) certify that the facility does not receive any payments from other entities 
or agencies; and (5) submit an application fee of $250,000 for each eligibility period.147   
Once plants are determined to be eligible, they are ranked according to how well the plant 
satisfies eligibility criteria.148   The distribution of ZECs is limited to forty percent of the total 
number of megawatt-hours distributed by the electric public utilities in the state for the previous 
energy year.149  Some critics believe this requirement will mean that New Jersey ratepayers must 
buy forty percent of their electricity from nuclear power plants, requiring out-of-state nuclear 
 
143Id. at 15. 
144 The BPU is a quasi-judicial body that invites petitions to be filed on issues of consumer protection, energy reform, 
deregulation of energy and the restructuring of utility rates to encourage energy conservation and competitive pricing 
in the industry. About BPU, STATE OF NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, 
https://www.nj.gov/bpu/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
145 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(b)(1) (2018). 
146 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was created as an independent agency by Congress in 1974 to 
ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian purposes while protecting people and the 
environment. The NRC regulates commercial nuclear power plants and other uses of nuclear materials, such as in 
nuclear medicine, through licensing, inspection and enforcement of its requirements. About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. 
COMMISSION, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). 
147 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(e)(1)-(5) (2018). 
148 N.J. STAT. ANN § 48.3.87.5(f) (2018). 
149 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(g)(1) (2018). 
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plants to fill the void.150   This is a mischaracterization of the law.  The law does not require that 
the Board distribute ZECs for forty percent of the megawatt-hours distributed in the previous 
energy year.  The law states that the Board cannot distribute ZECs beyond forty percent.   
ZECs will be funded through a “non-bypassable, irrevocable charge imposed on the electric 
public utility’s retail distribution customers”151 (the ratepayers), which is meant to reflect the 
“emissions avoidance benefits associated with the continued operation of selected nuclear power 
plants.”152  This charge is a tariff that has been approved by the Board at the required price of 
$0.004 per kilowatt-hour.153  Revenue from the tariff will be placed in a separate interest-bearing 
account for the sole purpose of purchasing ZECs from the participating nuclear plants.154  The 
board retains the discretion to reduce the charge passed on to the ratepayer to ensure that the “ZEC 
program remains affordable.”155  The reduction can only take effect in a second eligibility period, 
meaning that the tariff rate is locked in for a three year period for eligible and selected plants.156 
C. The November 19 Order 
On September 11, 2018, the BPU solicited comments and scheduled three public hearings 
by issuing a Public Order,157 and the November 19 Order summarized the comments and 
hearings.158 The positions of each of the participants and commenters remained unchanged from 
the initial legislative hearings, with opponents concerned mainly that the process be transparent. 
 
150 BPU Holds Nuclear Subsidy Public Hearing in AC, INSIDER NJ (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/bpu-holds-nuclear-subsidy-public-hearing-ac/. 
151 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(j)(1) (2018). 
152 Id. 
153 November 19 Order, supra, note 122, at 2. 
154 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(j)(1) (2018). 
155 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(j)(3)(a) (2018). 
156 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(j)(3)(b) (2018). 
157 I/M/O of the implementation of l. 2018, c. 16 regarding the establishment of a zero emission certificate program 
for eligible nuclear power plants, Notice of Public Hearings (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/pdf/publicnotice/ZEC-Program-Public-Hearing-Notice.pdf. 
158 November 19 Order, supra, note 122 at 2. 
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The BPU responded to this concern by granting motions by the Rate Counsel (Ms. Brand) and the 
IMM for PJM (Dr. Bowring) for access to the applicants’ confidential financial data that will be 
submitted by the applicants.159 
The order firmly establishes five eligibility criteria for nuclear power plants and creates 
two “teams” within the BPU: an “Eligibility team” and a “Ranking team.”160  If the Eligibility 
team determines that the an application is complete161, the Ranking team will have discretion in 
“scoring” the applications. The scoring can either be based on a pre-developed scoring matrix or 
another approach if the Ranking team decides that it is more practical.162  Each application must 
be scored to comply with the statutory requirement that eligible nuclear power plants are ranked 
and ZECs are distributed based on rank up forty percent of the total output from the previous 
energy year. 
D. Positions of Intervenors 
 The IMM and Ratepayer Advocate provided comments on the applications submitted by 
Salem I, Salem II and Hope Creek.  Each application certified that the unit will close within three 
years absent a “material financial change,”163 and that retirement decisions will be made in the 
normal course of business consistent with the best interests of the shareholders.164 
   PSEG Nuclear backs its position that a material financial change is unlikely because: (i) 
forward energy prices remain low; (ii) regulatory and compliance costs remain high; (iii) carbon 
 
159 Id. at 13-14. 
160 November 19 Order, supra, note 122, at 10. 
161 An application will be deemed complete if all required information to satisfy all the eligibility criteria is submitted. 
Id. at 11. 
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163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(a) (2018). Material financial change is not defined by the statute. 
164 See PSEG Nuclear LLC – ZEC Applications, supra, note 124. 
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abatement policy remains elusive; and (iv) projected revenues do not fully cover projected costs 
over the next three years.165 The legislation permits two ways for plants to demonstrate financial 
need. First, a plant can show that it does not project to cover its “risk-adjusted cost of capital.”166 
Second, it can certify that it is not projected to fully cover its costs and risks, including both 
operational and market risks.167 PSEG explicitly chose to certify its financial need with the second 
option. 
 As Ralph Izzo stated in the legislative hearing on December 20, 2017, “everything I said . 
. . is subject to second-guessing.”168 The intervenors have answered that call. Upon review of the 
confidential financial data, each intervenor conveys their belief that the applicants have overstated 
their costs and understated their revenues, and therefore do not meet their statutory burden of 
demonstrating that the plants are at risk of closure within three years absent a material financial 
change. Ms. Brand calls the costs “speculative and inappropriate” and goes as far to say that the 
costs are not verifiable.169 She states that the energy price projections should have used a range of 
values instead of price forwards.170 She also said that the application failed to account for future 
natural gas prices, did not include the benefits of the new tax code, and does not do an analysis of 
price impacts in the event that only one (or two) of the units shuts down.171 Ms. Brand believes 
that the BPU’s decision will not be based on a “full record relevant to the proceeding.”172 She 
 
165 Id. 
166 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(a). Cost of capital was rejected as a metric to be used for economic viability by 
Dennis Hart in the legislative hearings. See December 4, 2017 Joint Committee Hearing, supra, note 137.  
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3.87.5(a). 
168 Transcript of December 20, 2017 Joint Committee Meeting, available at 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/senatu12202017.pdf.  
169 Stephane A. Brand Comment Brief, supra, note 142 at 19. 
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further hints that this is the first time that PSEG has indicated that its plants are at risk of loss, 
despite the opportunity to do so in prior proceedings.173 
 Moreover, Ms. Brand interestingly argues that PSEG is wrong to say that the tariff rate of 
$0.004 per kilowatt hour is “immutable.”174 She argues that “clear statutory mandates” give the 
BPU broad discretion to establish “just and reasonable rates.”175 While that is true generally, that 
discretion has been limited somewhat by the legislature during the first eligibility period of the 
program. As Dr. Bowring’s comments on the submitted applications confirm, the decision of the 
BPU is “binary.”176 The BPU must either grant participation in the program at the set rate or deny 
the application outright. Dr. Bowring does note, however, that unit owners have an ongoing option 
to apply and re-apply.177 The November 19 Order confirms that when the BPU conducts its yearly 
review of the program, they will also “review any new applications under the same program 
guidelines.”178 It is therefore Dr. Bowring’s position that the applicants should be rejected this 
energy year so that aforementioned FERC proceedings regarding the energy market price in PJM 
can play out and give more clarity into expected energy prices going forward. 
 The BPU has acknowledged that the IMM is in “a unique position to review the financial 
viability of nuclear power plants seeking ZECs based on its experience” and “is essential to aid 
the Board in making the determinations required by the Act.”179 It further found that “the IMM’s 
ability to contribute to a complete and thorough review of information submitted by applicants 
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would significantly and substantially contribute to the Board’s understanding and determination 
of issues in this proceeding.” Moreover, the BPU found that the Rate Counsel’s “role as the public 
interest representative and advocate for all ratepayers, is essential to aid the Board in making the 
determinations required by the Act.”180 
 Aside from disclosure of applicants’ confidential financial information, however, the BPU 
does not explicitly grant the intervenors any additional powers. The power to appeal the BPU’s 
decision is likely to be the only other tool afforded to the intervenors.181 The likelihood of a 
successful appeal of the BPU’s decision to grant all three applications is unlikely, given the great 
deference that is afforded to administrative agencies182 and the undefined language in the statute 
that grants the BPU discretion in awarding program eligibility. Coupled with the unsuccessful 
constitutional challenges to the ZEC programs in New York and Illinois,183 successful judicial 
challenge to the legislation or BPU decision seems highly unlikely. 
IV. Analysis of Competing Agendas 
 
180 Id. 
181 For reference, parties granted intervenor status in FERC proceedings have the right to (i) participate in hearings 
before FERC's administrative law judges, (ii) file briefs, (iii) file for rehearing of a Commission decision, (iv) have 
legal standing in a Court of Appeals if they challenge the Commission's final decision, and (v) be placed on a service 
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Participation/Intervention in FERC Cases, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
https://www.ferc.gov/resources/faqs/active-int.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
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 The first three parts of this Comment explore the history of nuclear power in the U.S. and 
New Jersey, explaining why state legislators have decided to explore policy options to prevent 
early plant retirement. The BPU’s determination of applicant eligibility felt very much like a 
“battle of the experts,” where a court must decide between (1) conducting, for example, its own 
valuation of a corporation’s stock or actual damages in a tort claim and (2) determining which 
party’s expert witness has put forth the most credible information. The BPU was similarly faced 
with determining whether the analysis put forth by the intervenors recommending denial was more 
credible than the applicants’ own certifications that they are at risk of closure within three years 
and that they are unlikely to experience a material financial change. 
 It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that PSEG engaged in “rent-seeking” behavior, in 
which a business uses its position or resources to obtain some additional government benefit.184 
Put another way, rent-seeking is the act of attempting to increase existing wealth without creating 
new wealth.185 As noted by Dr. Bowring, subsidies are contagious.186 His comments suggest that 
PSEG is attempting to capitalize on the similarly enacted programs in New York and Illinois 
despite its ability to continue to operate Salem-Hope Creek profitably. Dr. Bowring, however, is 
not without his own agenda. 
 In his 2018 State of the Market report, Dr. Bowring states that “[i]t is the job of the [Market 
Monitoring Unit] to defend competitive markets.”187  The report goes on to say that “[t]he unit 
specific subsidy model” such as the ZEC program “is inconsistent with the PJM market design and 
 
184 Christina Majaski, Rent-Seeking, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp.  
185 Rent-Seeking: A Primer, FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Nov. 1, 2003), https://fee.org/articles/rent-
seeking-a-primer/.  
186 See December 4th Hearing, supra note 139. 
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inconsistent with the market paradigm and constitutes a significant threat to both.”188  Dr. 
Bowring’s conclusions are based on the fundamental theory that “markets solution[s] must 
recognize the role of competitive markets[.]”189 Dr. Bowring likely fully appreciates that the 
market may in fact force Salem-Hope Creek into early and permanent retirement – he may just fail 
to see this as a problem that must be prevented. As mentioned previously, those who favor market 
design believe that the closing of uneconomic plants represents a significant benefit of 
restructuring and competition in the electricity sector.190 Dr. Bowring states that a market approach 
to carbon is the preferred approach, instead of a technology or unit specific subsidy approach.191  
The market may be indifferent to permanent plant closure and state clean energy goals, and New 
Jersey has acted to prevent market indifference from impeding the ultimate goal of carbon emission 
reduction. 
 Ultimately, the BPU determined that it could not risk permanent plant closure.192 The BPU 
is tasked with obtaining clean energy goals that will be impossible to meet without the continued 
existence of Salem-Hope Creek in the near term. When issuing its decision, the BPU cited the 
“moral imperative for the State to invest in energy infrastructure that does not produce greenhouse 
gasses.”193   
 Rate increases resulting from the award of ZECs to program applicants may be more than 
a mere annoyance to the average homeowner. Large businesses may see six to seven-figure 
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increases in energy bills, putting tremendous strain on continued operation.194  However, the 
decision-maker’s priority is New Jersey’s clean energy future.   PSEG signaled throughout the 
entire legislative and regulatory process that they will begin to shut down the plants if they are not 
awarded ZEC payments.195  Regardless of whether the financial data showed that each plant is at 
risk of closure within three years without a material financial change, the plants were granted 
program eligibility because the potential practical consequences of denying eligibility prove to be 
too great.  
 “Some people rob you with a gun and others rob you with a pen,” stated Sierra Club 
Director Jeff Tittel in reference to the BPU’s decision.196  Despite months of process intended to 
legitimize the BPU’s decision, the debate surrounding PSEG’s financial need for ZEC payments 
feels unresolved.  The law was drafted with somewhat ambiguous and undefined terms – “fuel 
diversity,” “resilience,” “material financial change,” – to give the BPU the discretion it needed to 
approve the applications without a definitive financial benchmark. Government regulation is 
generally thought to instill a process to which agencies can apply facts and come up with a correct 
outcome.  New Jersey’s implementation of its ZEC program demonstrates that regardless of what 
may be the correct, factual outcome pursuant to a specifically prescribed process, government 
regulators can use their discretion under the law to land on what they feel is the most acceptable 
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outcome when assessing both specific situational facts and overarching legislative goals such as 
New Jersey’s clean energy targets. 
IV. Connecticut’s Millstone Saga 
 A similar process to New Jersey’s ZEC program implementation recently played out in 
Connecticut. Connecticut’s process provides a good reference case based on the similarities to 
New Jersey: (i) each state operates within a deregulated market197 and (ii) each process questioned 
whether plants in question are truly “at risk.”  In July 2017, Connecticut’s governor issued an 
executive order requiring DEEP and PURA to review “the current and projected economic 
viability of the Millstone plants”, “the role of existing nuclear generating facilities . . . in helping 
Connecticut meet interim and long-term carbon and other emissions targets at the least cost”, “the 
best mechanisms to ensure continued progress toward those targets, and considerations for whether 
and, if so, how such mechanisms, including potential multistate collaborations, should be 
implemented, and [t]he compatibility of such mechanisms with competitive wholesale and retail 
electricity markets and their effect on ratepayers.”198 
 Before the issuance of this report, Connecticut passed legislation that was also aimed at 
providing economic relief to nuclear power plants struggling to remain competitive.199  Located in 
Waterford, Connecticut, the two Millstone units are the only units operating in the state.200  The 
bill allows Dominion Power, owner and operator of Millstone, to submit requests for proposals 
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(RFPs) for zero-carbon resources on behalf of Millstone, implying that the state will now value 
nuclear energy for attributes other than price.  Bidders vying for Connecticut’s zero-carbon 
resources can bid in three separate categories: (1) existing resource, (2) new resource, and (3) at 
risk resource.201  The State’s Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) determines whether a 
resource is “at risk” and thus eligible for subsidies in the form of “above-market rates,” also set by 
PURA.202 Millstone’s permission to submit bid proposals was conditioned on the market study 
conducted pursuant to EO 59 finding that “it is in the public interest to allow Millstone to 
participate in the clean energy solicitation.”203 
 The report compiled by DEEP and PURA determined that the “Millstone nuclear units 
provide significant value to Connecticut” in regard to “fuel diversity, fuel security, and compliance 
with environmental goals.”204 As a result, they concluded that DEEP should conduct a procurement 
for new and existing zero carbon generation facilities, but not until existing resources such as 
Millstone “demonstrate through the submission of credible financial data that they are at risk to 
retire.”205  Implicit within this determination is that Dominion resisted disclosure of  the financial 
data needed to do an at-risk analysis. Based on publicly available information, the report concluded 
that Millstone is economically viable through 2035.206 
 Once prompted by this report, Dominion disclosed the necessary data under a protective 
order to be reviewed PURA, DEEP and the Office of the Consumer Counsel.207 After review, state 
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regulators ruled that Millstone was at risk and could bid into bid into the carbon-free procurement 
auction.208 In early 2019, DEEP selected Millstone’s ten-year bid that includes almost fifty percent 
of Millstone’s output. Utilities are now “directed to negotiate for a price that reflects Dominion’s 
costs and risks to keep the plant during the at-risk period of the bid, from 2022 to 2029.”209 
A. Comparing New Jersey and Connecticut 
The goal of any regulatory process is, of course, to get it right. Each state invested 
significant time and money into studies and solicitation from the public about whether these 
nuclear units need financial assistance to avoid early retirement. Each power generation company 
eventually disclosed confidential financial data to regulators so that they might conduct an 
independent analysis based on a full record. The difference is that DEEP and the Office of 
Consumer Counsel recommended that Millstone be labeled “at risk.” In New Jersey, the 
intervenors believe that PSEG and Exelon did not need to be awarded any subsidy to remain 
operational. 
 In each process, at least one projection demonstrated that the plant may not be at risk of 
early retirement. In Connecticut, that projection was based on publicly available information. In 
New Jersey, the recommendation that the ZEC applications be rejected is based on the confidential 
financial information disclosed by PSEG. The question then becomes whether a BPU decision to 










 The ZEC Act, in its findings and declarations, states that the Energy Master Plan (EMP) 
“requires significant revisions to ensure that 100 percent of the State’s electric energy needs are 
generated by clean energy sources by 2050.”  The Energy Master Plan Committee is chaired by 
the BPU’s Chief of Staff, Grace Power.  One of the main state employees deciding which nuclear 
power plants will be eligible and ultimately receive ZECs is also in charge of drawing up the 
revisions to the EMP. The BPU conducted a thorough investigation of the problem, holding 
hearings, soliciting public participation from all sectors, and seeking assistance from experienced 
professionals.  
 Emerging from the lengthy process is a fundamental disagreement about whether unit-
specific subsidies have a place in a deregulated power market.  The process itself serves as a way 
for the public to feel like the decision is in line with the legislative objective that PSEG doesn’t 
get paid unless it truly needs the money to operate.  If the BPU truly decided based on PSEG’s 
financial need and determined that the plants did not need the money, the company would close 
the plants and foreclose the opportunity to meet the primary objective of the legislation – carbon 
emission reduction through a diverse generation mix that is capable of meeting high energy 
demand. Ultimately, the sense of urgency surrounding the need to reduce carbon emissions proved 
too strong for the BPU to reject the three applications. 
 
